The editorial team of FBRK has conducted an extensive investigation into the condition of the Astana (Vyacheslav) Reservoir and the Ishim River — the key sources of water supply for the capital and surrounding regions. Over several months, we have systematically studied the situation, analysed data, and tracked the activities of numerous entities affecting these water bodies. The time has come to summarise the findings and present a complete picture of what is happening.
The Astana Reservoir, which was commissioned in the 1960s, has historically performed several critical functions: it regulates the flow of the Ishim River, supplies the capital with drinking water, and is used for irrigation and industrial needs. However, in recent years, this strategic facility has found itself at the epicentre of worrying processes that potentially threaten water quality and the ecological safety of the region.
Our investigation began with the discovery of ploughed fields along the banks and tributaries of the reservoir. The founder of FBRK, Kirill Pavlov, found that some of them are located critically close, just 25 metres from the water's edge. During spring floods and summer rains, agrochemicals, soil residues, and petroleum products from agricultural machinery are inevitably washed from these areas into the water, creating a serious threat of pollution.
The FBRK editorial team established that the land near the reservoir is on long-term lease to a number of agricultural firms and cooperatives, including SAGILYA i E LLP, Tamyr 2024 LLP, Izhevsk PC, and Mikhailovskoye LLP. Notably, some of these structures have links to former civil servants, while others are burdened with significant debt obligations and seized assets.
To obtain full and reliable information, we sent official requests to the relevant ministries: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Ecology, and the Ministry of Water Resources.
The Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Control of the Ministry of Health presented an optimistic assessment: according to their data, in 2023 all 26 water samples (8 sanitary-chemical and 18 microbiological) met the standards. In 2024, out of 36 samples, only one showed an exceedance — for iron content during the flood period.
The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation holds a similar position. According to the information provided, analyses by Astana Su Arnasy dated 4 February 2025 confirm that the raw water meets the standards. It is particularly emphasised that "the change in class is not related to pollution of the water body, but is due to a revision of background concentrations". In 2024, according to the data provided, the background concentrations of suspended solids were recalculated from 10.25 mg/dm³ to 4.45 mg/dm³.
However, the data from the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources presents the situation in a somewhat different light. Their monitoring unequivocally indicates that "the water quality in the Astana Reservoir in 2024 is classified as Class 4 due to the concentration of suspended solids – 5.467 mg/dm³". At the same time, the indicators varied significantly throughout the year: from Class 2 in August to Class 4 in May, June, September, and October. In October, exceedances were recorded not only for suspended solids (5.6 mg/dm³) but also for magnesium (32.6 mg/dm³).
Delving deeper into the investigation, we turned to the land use map and discovered an ambiguous situation concerning other plots near the Astana Reservoir. Formally, the land around the water body is classified as forest fund and should serve as a natural filter. In practice, however, it has been divided into plots and leased out, including to private entities. A livestock farm and private farms operate within the water protection zone, and a brick factory is located nearby. The legislation, we should recall, contains a direct ban on locating livestock facilities in water protection zones.
Upon detailed examination of the ownership structure of these organisations, a number of interesting connections emerge. Firstly, many of them are in difficult financial situations, burdened with multi-million dollar debts and tax arrears. Secondly, among the owners and directors, we found people who previously held high-ranking positions in state bodies or have close ties to current officials.
For instance, the management of one enterprise was linked to the corporate secretary of JSC NC Food Contract Corporation. Another company was controlled by an individual with a history of legal problems. Particularly noteworthy is that one of the plots previously belonged to Kairat-S LLP, the name of which echoes that of a well-known political figure who recently publicly returned assets to the state.
After the publication of preliminary materials, our editorial team sent further requests to the relevant departments. The responses received only reinforced the impression of a split between what the regulations say and the actual state of affairs.
The Akimat of Astana reported that control over the land around the reservoir is exercised by the administrations of the Tselinograd and Arshaly districts, and that some plots were allocated before 2005 — information about them is absent from current information systems. The Department of Natural Resources acknowledged that the project for the sanitary protection zone is only planned to be developed. In other words, the regulatory basis for exercising proper control apparently simply does not exist at present. The Ministry of Ecology confirmed that in 2024, inspections of economic entities in the third belt of the sanitary zone were not carried out. Thus, the impact of these enterprises on the water body effectively remains unstudied and uncontrolled.
Investigating areas further upstream, our editorial team discovered an even more alarming situation. Kirill Pavlov conducted a field investigation and identified plots along the Ishim where illegal extraction of sand and gravel is taking place at a distance of 30-40 metres from the water, which is a direct violation of water protection legislation.
(Photo: Kazakh Chuvash / hunn.kz)
Our editorial team found that these plots are leased by companies such as Karer-Mir 3, Neft Gold, SG Peschany Karer, and others. Behind these legal entities are chains of owners with connections to former deputies, the SPK Esil, and major construction contractors. Many of them have formal permits, but their actual activities pose potential risks to the water body.
Of particular interest are the identified connections to political figures. For example, among the founders of one company is Gabit Satmagambetov, a former deputy of the Astana city maslikhat and an influential figure in the region's construction business. In 2021, he served as deputy chairman of the commission on construction, ecology, transport, trade, and housing and communal services. Notably, his remit included precisely those issues directly related to regulating activities in water protection zones. This combination of official powers and commercial interests raises legitimate questions about a potential conflict of interest.
Equally interesting is the international aspect of our investigation. The citizenship of Bakai Mambetaliev, the head of Neft-SV LLP, raises questions about the transboundary nature of the use of Kazakhstan's natural resources. In the context of protecting the country's water resources, a logical question arises: how effectively can national legislation regulate the activities of enterprises whose leaders and, possibly, main economic interests are located outside of Kazakhstan?
And once again, our editorial team turned to the relevant departments to find out how the situation appears in official reports.
The Yesil Basin Inspectorate clearly defined the boundaries of the water protection zone: 500-1000 metres, and the strip: 50-100 metres. At the same time, the department acknowledged that it had issued no approvals for development of the said plots, and that no inspections of compliance with the regime had been carried out there at all. The Ministry of Ecology presented impeccable permit documents for all the mining companies. Formally, everything is in order.
However, the RSE Kazhydromet classifies the water of the Ishim as 'polluted' with exceedances of zinc and phosphorus content. According to their data, in 2024 there was a recalculation of background concentrations of suspended solids. But if the water is classified as 'polluted', it means it does contain pollutants — regardless of how the standards are recalculated in offices. This is particularly interesting in the context of the Yesil Basin Inspectorate's statement that "over the last 5 years (2020-2024) and in 2025, no facts of discharge of pollutants into water bodies have been established".
There is another curious detail in the response from the Ministry of Ecology — a mention of the construction of a protective dam for the village of Zhibek Zholy. It makes one wonder, why was a protective dam suddenly needed? Could it be related to changes in the river's hydrological regime caused by that very extraction?
In the end, we are presented with a picture where theory and practice exist separately. In theory, everything is regulated, everything is according to the law. But what about in practice?
First and foremost, attention is drawn to the fragmentation of the regulatory framework and the lack of a unified regulatory approach. The result is a kind of grey area where departmental interests prevail over public ones, and effective control seems practically absent.
The identified contradictions in the official data from the ministries indicate not so much an intentional distortion of information, but rather insufficient coordination between different state bodies. The impression is that each department operates with its own methodologies and assessment criteria, which leads to inconsistency in decision-making and policy implementation.
An important aspect of the problem is the shadowy intertwining of commercial and administrative interests. Our investigation has revealed numerous instances where former or current officials are linked to enterprises operating in water protection zones. This situation creates risks of an institutional conflict of interest, where economic motives may conflict with the tasks of environmental protection and ensuring public safety.
Equally alarming is the situation regarding the absence of proper environmental monitoring. The fact that inspections of enterprises in the third belt of the sanitary zone were not carried out for a year, and the project for the zone itself has still not been developed, points to serious gaps in the state control system. Under such conditions, water pollution can become hidden and cumulative, only manifesting itself in the long term through ecosystem degradation and deteriorating water quality.
The Astana Reservoir and the Ishim River are not merely hydraulic structures or ecosystems — they are strategic resources of national importance, upon which the vital support of the capital and surrounding regions depends. Without a fundamental reassessment of the approaches to their protection and exploitation, it is impossible to guarantee long-term environmental safety and sustainable development for the entire region.
Understanding the importance of the topic and the response it generated among our readers, on 7 April 2025, the FBRK editorial team sent three different requests to the Department for Land Resource Management (DULR) of the Akmola region, asking for inspections to be carried out on each of the sites. We only received responses on 23 May — after a month and a half of 'inspections'. And although the FBRK editorial team awaited the results with particular trepidation, the department responded to all three requests in a completely identical manner. The department effectively inspected (or did it?) only the plots along the Ishim, and then copied the same response for the Astana Reservoir.
Interestingly, in its response, the department directly cited the prohibition of subsoil use on water fund lands, enshrined in Article 25 of the Code 'On Subsoil and Subsoil Use', but never provided a legal assessment of the legality of issuing plots for mineral extraction within the water protection zone. On one hand, it states that such land can be transferred for temporary use; on the other, it quotes the norm on the direct prohibition. This contradiction, as one might guess, remained unexplained.
Furthermore, the department remained silent on whether the restrictions of the water protection zone were taken into account in the land records and whether inspections for compliance with the intended use of the plots were carried out. Instead of active control, the department limited itself to reviewing documents and forwarded the materials to another department — without deadlines or guarantees of