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Administrative deadlock around the ASI in Kazakhstan amid 3.4 billion tenge in fines

Submitted by Gorin_S on

Not long ago, the editorial board of FBRK sent official requests to three bodies involved in the operation of automated measurement stations (AMS): the committee for road transport and transport control of the Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Kazakhstan, NC KazAvtoZhol JSC and Automatic System LLP — the main contractor we know of for installing the AMS. Replies have been received. Together with the official statistics on fines for June–December 2025, they help paint a picture of how the control system works and why none of the parties consider themselves responsible for its failures.

FROM ZERO COLLECTIONS IN JUNE TO 2 BILLION TENGE IN DECEMBER

The statistics provided by the committee for road transport and transport control show rapid growth in figures since the launch of electronic orders via the Unified Register of Administrative Proceedings (URAP). From 10 June 2025, the system began issuing fines automatically — and the numbers increased every month.

In June, 1,083 violations were recorded, with fines totalling 196 million tenge — but zero collections. This is quite understandable: the system had only just started, orders were being sent to recipients, and the payment deadline had not yet expired. By December, the picture had changed fundamentally: 13,056 recorded violations, 3.4 billion tenge in fines imposed, and only 2 billion tenge collected — that is, around 59% of the amount levied.

This gap, almost 1.4 billion tenge, requires an explanation. Part of the sum could be due to standard appeal and payment deadlines. However, given that the prosecutor’s office is simultaneously conducting a mass review of administrative proceedings related to AMS malfunctions, a significant portion of these funds may result from fines issued in error.

Essentially, this involves money that was originally meant to go towards road repairs. These fines typically compensate for the damage that overloaded trucks cause to road infrastructure, with funds directed to its restoration. Therefore, the gap between fines assessed and those actually collected is not just administrative statistics but represents a shortfall in resources for repairing roads that continue to deteriorate.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR APPROVING CONTRACTORS

One of the key questions from FBRK concerned the regulation of companies allowed to install and maintain AMS: who determines the requirements for contractors and bears responsibility for the quality of the equipment?

According to the committee’s response, the approval of legal entities is regulated by local executive bodies and NC KazAvtoZhol JSC. The committee directly stated that no additional approvals, conclusions, or recommendations from it are provided for when drafting tender documentation, technical specifications, and qualification requirements for potential suppliers.

NC KazAvtoZhol JSC, in turn, reported that procurement is carried out through the public procurement portal in accordance with the legislation on quasi-public sector procurement, and that new AMS will only be installed following conclusions from the National Centre for Road Asset Quality.

At the same time, KazAvtoZhol has no access to data on fines and violations — all data goes directly to the Intelligent Transport System (ITS) and the Information and Analytical System of the Transport Database (IAS TDB) of the committee.

This creates a vicious circle: the committee, which receives all the data from the AMS, does not participate in selecting contractors. NC KazAvtoZhol JSC, which selects the contractors, has no access to the results of their work. In other words, no single body exercises end-to-end control — from the quality of equipment installation to the correctness of the fines issued.

TOO «AUTOMATIC SYSTEM»

Automatic System LLP, which implemented the AMS in 11 regions of Kazakhstan, responded to the FBRK request in a technically neutral tone. According to the company, the AMS hardware and software complex (HSC) does not accumulate data on violations and does not generate administrative documents — it merely transmits the recorded information to the committee’s system.

Of particular note is the clarification regarding the structure of contractual relations: the company has no direct contractual relationship with NC KazAvtoZhol JSC. After the warranty period, technical maintenance of stations on sections managed by NC KazAvtoZhol JSC is carried out by the KAZh Service division, not the contractor itself.

This means that by the time technical faults, surface deformation, or incorrect weighing equipment readings appear, Automatic System LLP may formally no longer be responsible for the operation of a particular station.

The company explained the technical configurations of individual stations solely as being due to customer requirements. In other words, if a variable message sign or rear number plate camera is missing somewhere, it is the customer’s choice, not a shortcoming of the contractor.

In addition to the written response, company representatives explained to the editorial board that the camera captures the state registration plate, not the trailer as a separate object. The company also considers the practice of capturing the rear number plate excessive, pointing out that it is not used in European countries or Russia.

Regarding the dirty camera lenses observed at a number of stations, the company stated that the technical maintenance of existing stations falls within the responsibility of KazAvtoZhol, not the contractor.

WHO BEARS THE COSTS OF DIFFUSED RESPONSIBILITY

We believe that the described structure of responsibility has specific practical consequences. The prosecutor’s office is conducting a mass review of administrative cases — meaning that some of the 13,000 fines imposed over the seven months of 2025 may be overturned. But even if this happens, none of the three participants in the chain — the committee, KazAvtoZhol, Automatic System LLP — would formally be found at fault: each acted within its remit and contractual obligations.

In parallel, from 1 January 2026, a ban on the operation of category N3 tipper trucks (over 12 tonnes) came into force, affecting the interests of more than 100,000 drivers. In conditions where the AMS themselves record data with inaccuracies, and the mechanism for contesting fines remains complex, the administrative burden on businesses will only increase.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing expansion of the AMS network and the introduction of new restrictions for freight transport, the grounds for contesting fines are not only preserved but are becoming particularly relevant. At the same time, the question of exactly who bears responsibility for what is happening still lacks a clear and comprehensive official answer.

The FBRK editorial board will continue to monitor the situation with the AMS.