When subsoil users are turning over 640,000 sq. m of coastal lands of the Ural River into an industrial zone for extracting sand and gravel mixture, a legitimate question arises: what are state bodies doing to protect one of Kazakhstan's main waterways?
The editorial board of FBRK sent official inquiries to the relevant departments to understand the situation.
The Zhayik-Caspian Basin Inspectorate notes in its response the limitations of its authority. They state that, within the framework of the media request, "it is not possible to initiate an inspection". Instead of providing specific information about the activities of companies developing the bed of the Ural River, the inspectorate lists regulatory acts and points to the role of local executive bodies.
The inspectorate reminds of the existence of the Resolution of the Akimat of the West Kazakhstan Region dated 24 February 2017, which defines water protection zones and strips. At the same time, the department clarifies that "conducting an environmental impact assessment when registering plots in water protection zones is not within the Inspectorate's competence", which indicates, at the very least, a fragmentation of control over the environmental safety of water resources.
The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, for its part, shared hydrological data with us. According to the department's information, there has been extremely uneven water supply to the river in recent years: a low-water period from 2018 to 2022, when the flow was only 4.3 cu. km, was followed by a record-breaking 2024 with 19.8 cu. km.
The Ministry reports on a "Unified Roadmap" for cooperation with Russia and "joint studies of the hydrological regime", but says nothing about what is happening directly in the riverbed on the territory of Kazakhstan.
It is telling that the department shifts the focus to transboundary cooperation with Russia, mentioning that "the main inflow of the Zhayik River is formed on the territory of the Russian Federation (70%)". This creates a highly convenient position: if something is wrong with the river, the problem might well lie on the Russian side.
Meanwhile, while officials exchange formal replies and engage in monitoring, development companies continue to extract profit from the exploitation of river resources, investing in the systematic destruction of the river ecosystem.
And the most interesting thing is that no one seems to be specifically responsible for a comprehensive assessment of the impact of industrial activity on the Ural River. The Basin Inspectorate only "coordinates the selection of land plots", but does not control the consequences of extraction. The Ministry monitors the amount of water, but not what is happening to the riverbed.
As a result, an alarming situation is emerging: each department formally performs its functions, but no one is responsible for the fate of the river as a whole. And while state bodies are shifting responsibility onto each other, businesses continue to extract natural resources, irreversibly changing the appearance of one of Kazakhstan's most important rivers.
If the situation continues in the same vein, then in ten years, analytical reports on water quality and quantity may simply become meaningless — because the river, as we know it today, may simply no longer exist.
In the next part, the FBRK editorial board will examine how the Ministry of Ecology assesses the situation with the Ural River and to what extent its position aligns with the responses already received from other departments.
To be continued…