Kazakhstan is on the verge of radical changes in the taxi sector: the proposed bill could significantly transform the passenger road transport market.
However, global experience shows that self-regulatory organisations in the passenger transport sector have repeatedly demonstrated their ineffectiveness and danger.
For example, in the USA (California), handing over licensing to taxi associations led to blocking access for new market entrants, price inflation (minimum fare $15) and a sharp decline in service quality.
In Brazil, the organisation ATRI, responsible for licensing intercity buses, carried out superficial vehicle checks. The result was a tragic accident between São Paulo and Belo Horizonte in 2018, claiming 14 lives. It emerged that the braking system had not been serviced for over a year, even though ATRI had formally approved the license.
In Russia (2014-2018), the Union of Bus Carriers coordinated a 30% increase in fares, and inadequate technical control led to a major accident with 7 fatalities.
In every case, governments had to urgently take back control, as self-regulation consistently led to cartel collusion, corruption, increased accident rates and loss of life.
But the most striking example of the destructive consequences of self-regulation is Turkey (Istanbul), where such a system has been in place since 1965. Istanbul's experience demonstrates serious risks — from rising prices and deteriorating service quality to market monopolisation and the shift of business into the shadows.
Earlier, the editorial team at FBRK reported that a bill was being considered in Kazakhstan which envisages the creation of mandatory self-regulatory organisations (SROs) for all carriers in the form of Chambers of Road Carriers with broad powers – from setting tariffs to collecting membership fees.
The proposed SRO model bears an alarming resemblance to the Istanbul Chamber of Taxi Drivers (İTEO), operating in Turkey. Both organisations were conceived as mechanisms to protect carrier rights and regulate the market, but in practice demonstrate a tendency to protect the interests of a limited group of participants.
In both cases, broad powers are granted to control market access, creating fertile ground for various abuses and potentially leading to artificial restrictions on competition.
The Istanbul model for managing the taxi industry serves as a telling example of how good intentions lead to unexpected negative consequences for the market, consumers, and industry participants themselves.
İTEO, created as an organisation to protect carrier rights and regulate the market, is in practice often criticised for lobbying the interests of a narrow group of license holders and its inability to solve the industry's systemic problems.
Earlier, we suggested that granting SROs the right to set market entry criteria could create grounds for abuse — participants who don't see eye to eye with the association's leadership risk being pushed out of the legal business. This is exactly how it works in Turkey.
According to a recent study by the international consulting firm EY Türkiye, the taxi market volume is 47.8 billion Turkish lira, but the number of taxis has remained virtually unchanged since 1991, hovering around 17,000-20,000, despite the city's population doubling and the tourism flow increasing tenfold.
As a result, taxi availability has fallen from 2.38 to 1.3 vehicles per 1,000 residents, significantly lower than in other major cities (New York - 6.3; London - 8.2; Moscow - 14.7). Meanwhile, around 86% of residents have experienced difficulty finding a taxi at least once.
The situation with fares is telling: just in 2024-2025, taxi prices in Istanbul rose several times. In January 2024 – by 28%, in July 2024 – by a further 13-22%, and in January 2025 – by 35%.
In 2025, the average cost of a taxi ride from Istanbul Airport (IST) to the central districts of the city (e.g., Sultanahmet, Taksim, Kadıköy), a distance ranging from 40-50 km, is approximately 1,400–1,500 Turkish lira (≈19,200–20,500 tenge) for a standard (yellow) taxi. More comfortable taxis (blue and black) will cost on average 1,600–1,900 lira (≈21,900–26,000 tenge).
İTEO actively fights against competition. For instance, the organisation secured a ban on Uber in Turkey, justifying it with the protection of local carriers' interests. However, this led to an increase in illegal transport – many drivers continued to work without official permission.
Journalist Bedri Yılmaz describes widespread problems in the industry in his articles: aggressive driver behaviour, fraud, and inflated fares. Tourists suffer especially, negatively impacting the country's reputation. In his view, İTEO is mainly concerned with collecting money from its members rather than solving real problems.
Turkey's experience shows that excessive regulation and the concentration of power in the hands of self-regulatory organisations in the transport industry can lead to serious problems: monopolisation of the industry, artificial supply shortages, significant price increases accompanied by a decline in service quality, a mass exodus of drivers to the shadow economy, and an overall reduction in the accessibility of taxis for the public.
Perhaps Kazakhstan needs to take this experience into account. Instead of creating new administrative barriers, it should focus on implementing technology and improving service quality, maintaining a balance between regulation and market mechanisms that ensure the industry develops in the interests of all participants.