The National Statistics Bureau has published preliminary data on Kazakhstan's external and mutual trade for January–February 2026. The figures paint a mixed picture: exports are rising in monetary terms, but the structure remains unchanged, imports are accelerating faster, and dependence on the Russian market persists — and it still dictates almost everything.
EXPORTS HAVE RISEN
In the first two months of 2026, Kazakhstan exported goods worth $12.04 billion — an 11.3% increase compared to the same period in 2025 ($10.82 billion). At first glance, this is confident growth. But if you dig deeper, it turns out this is growth in money, not in volumes and structure.
The main item of Kazakhstan's exports is mineral products (primarily oil and gas), which in January–February 2026 accounted for 58.3% of all exports, or $7.02 billion. A year earlier, this figure was slightly higher at 64.1%, meaning the share of the “raw materials core” in the structure has slipped a little. This would sound like good news if it had been replaced by higher value-added products. But no, this share has been taken by metals.
Metals and articles thereof are the second most important export item. Their share rose from 14.2% to 17.5%, and the volume from $1.54 billion to $2.10 billion. In third place are food products: $1.42 billion, or 11.8% of total exports, compared to 9.2% a year earlier. This is real growth, almost one and a half times, and one of the few signals of diversification, albeit still modest.
Meanwhile, machinery, equipment and vehicles lost ground: $438.8 million compared to $584.7 million a year earlier, with the share falling from 5.4% to 3.6%. The country is still exporting raw materials, not technology.
WHERE KAZAKHSTAN'S EXPORTS GO
In trade with partners in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) for January–February 2026, Kazakhstan exported goods worth $1.27 billion — compared to $1.31 billion for the same period in 2025. A slight decrease of 3.5%. The structure of trade within the union remains highly concentrated.
Russia is the absolute dominant: $987.3 million, or 78% of all Kazakhstan's exports to the EAEU. However, compared to 2025, supplies to Russia fell by 9.3% (from $1.09 billion). This is the only major partner in the union where Kazakhstan has lost ground.
At the opposite pole is Armenia: $8.7 million in exports, but growth of 2.95 times. The small volume makes the percentage indicator not very representative, but the very fact of such a jump is noteworthy.
Kyrgyzstan remains the third recipient of Kazakh goods within the union — $226.2 million, an increase of 15%. Belarus — $43.1 million, growth of almost 1.8 times.
Looking at total exports, including both the EAEU and the rest of the world, outside the CIS goes $9.71 billion, or 80.7% of all exports. CIS countries receive only about 19.4% of Kazakh goods. This shows that Kazakhstan's key sales markets are not its immediate neighbours, but Europe and Asia, primarily receiving oil and metals.
WHAT EXACTLY IS SENT ABROAD
Wheat and maslin (a mixture of wheat and rye grains) are among the main non-raw material export goods. In January–February 2026, $378.4 million worth was shipped — a 60.7% increase on last year. Kazakhstan actively supplied grain to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Italy. Unusual destinations include Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
Meat and offal were exported for $39.5 million — an increase of 20.2%. Main buyers are Uzbekistan, Russia, Qatar, and the UAE.
Wheat flour is another growing product: $9.9 million, growth of 67.9%. The main market is Kyrgyzstan.
IMPORTS ARE GROWING FASTER THAN EXPORTS
While exports grew by just over 11%, imports over the same period rose significantly more. In January–February 2026, Kazakhstan imported goods worth $9.64 billion — compared to $8.65 billion a year earlier, an increase of 11.5%. The trade balance remains positive at about $2.4 billion, but the gap between exports and imports is slowly narrowing.
The structure of imports eloquently shows what the country lacks. Almost 45% of all imports are machinery, equipment, vehicles, instruments and apparatus: $4.34 billion, up from $3.76 billion a year earlier. This is not just a lot; it is a signal that the country's production base still relies on critically important components from abroad.
The second largest import item was mineral products — $844.8 million (an increase of more than 1.5 times from $545.8 million). It seems strange that an oil-producing country imports fuel, but the reason is simple — there is a lack of necessary processing capacity and convenient logistics.
Food products are imported for $1.11 billion — an increase of 6.2% from $1.04 billion. The majority comes from Russia and non-CIS countries.
DOES KAZAKHSTAN BUY ALMOST EVERYTHING FROM RUSSIA?
In trade with union partners, Kazakhstan imported goods worth $3.25 billion in January–February 2026 — a 25.1% increase on last year ($2.60 billion). The ratio between exports ($1.27 billion) and imports ($3.25 billion) in mutual trade with the EAEU shows a significant negative balance of minus $1.98 billion.
Russia accounts for $3.01 billion of that $3.25 billion — that is, 92.8% of all imports from the EAEU. A year ago the figure was comparable: $2.43 billion, but growth was 24%.
Belarus provides $133.8 million (growth of 23.9%), Kyrgyzstan — $95.8 million (growth of 67.9%), Armenia — $3.1 million (growth more than double).
What exactly is imported from the EAEU? Fuel from Russia — $624.5 million. Food products — $593.6 million, including milk, meat, chocolate, sugar — all of this comes mainly from Russia and Belarus. Russia also supplies railway carriages and railway equipment, and articles of metal.
WHAT THE STATISTICS SAY
The data from the National Statistics Bureau allows us to formulate several observations.
First: the raw material dependence of exports has not gone away. Oil, gas and metals consistently provide about 76% of all exports. The slight decrease in the share of mineral products in 2026 does not indicate diversification; it is explained by the faster growth of metals, another raw material segment. Food exports are growing, and this is a positive signal, but their volume ($1.42 billion) is incomparable to the oil sector's $7 billion.
In turn, the problem with the raw material model is that a significant part of the added value is created outside the country. Kazakhstan, in this scheme, acts as a supplier of basic resources, while the more complex production stages and profits from deep processing are concentrated with external partners.
Second: imports of machinery and equipment consistently account for almost half of all imports. This means the country is critically dependent on external supplies for its own production and infrastructure. A decrease or disruption in this flow directly affects industrial activity.
Third: the concentration on Russia in both exports and imports remains high. In imports from the EAEU, Russia's share is 92.8%. Such asymmetry makes Kazakh trade vulnerable to any changes in Russian economic policy, sanctions pressure, or market fluctuations.
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES
If the dynamics of the first two months continue, Kazakhstan may record growth in total trade turnover by the end of 2026, but the surplus of exports over imports will gradually decline. The growth in imports of machinery and equipment can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, it is investment in production capacity; on the other, it is an additional burden on foreign exchange resources.
The faster growth in imports of mineral products from Russia, combined with a reduction in Kazakh exports of oil products in some directions, creates an interesting imbalance. The country extracts more than it processes domestically, and at the same time imports processed fuel. The statistics record this structural issue, but its solution already lies in the realm of industrial and infrastructure policy.
The growth in exports to Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus, even with modest absolute figures, suggests that Kazakhstan is gradually increasing its presence in the union's markets not only as a buyer, but also as a supplier. Maintaining this trend and filling it with higher value-added products is a task on which the country's long-term competitiveness within the EAEU will depend.